To examine when and why animals break up ¢ghts between others in their group, I modelled whether winner' and`loser' e¡ects might be one element driving the evolution of intervention behaviour. I considered one particular type of intervention: when the intervener simply breaks up ¢ghts between two others, but does not favour either party in so doing. When victories at timeT + 1 are more likely given a victory at time T (i.e. winner e¡ects), intervention is often favoured. Intervention is favoured in these circumstances because the intervening party in essence stops others from`getting on a roll' and climbing up any hierarchy that exists. However, when loser e¡ects alone are at work (defeats at time T + 1 are more likely given a defeat at time T), breaking up ¢ghts between others is never selected. If both winner and loser e¡ects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two e¡ects. The greater the winner e¡ect relative to the loser e¡ect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve.
INTRODUCTION
A number of factors can determine the outcome of dyadic aggressive interactions between group members. The most obvious of these factors is resource holding power (RHP : Parker 1974; Maynard Smith & Parker 1976; Parker & Rubinstein 1981) of combatants, often measured by some size index. In addition to`intrinsic' factors such as RHP, extrinsic' forces also a¡ect the outcome of aggressive interactions. The three most well-studied extrinsic forces are territory ownership (which typically increases an animal's probability of defeating an opponent; see Pusey & Packer (1995) for a review), winner e¡ects, and loser e¡ects. Winner e¡ects refer to the increased probability of victory at time T + 1, as a result of victory at time T. Loser e¡ects refer to the increased probability of being defeated at time T + 1, given a prior defeat at timeT (see Chase et al. (1994) for a review of studies on winner and loser e¡ects, and Landau (1951a,b) and Dugatkin (1997) for theoretical treatments).
In addition to experimentally manipulating extrinsic and intrinsic factors to determine their importance for dyadic aggressive interactions, recent work has shown that much aggression occurs within the context of polyadic interactions (i.e. interactions involving more than two individuals). Examples of coalitions and alliances have been documented in a number of primate species (Harcourt & de Waal 1992; Chapais 1995) , but are not restricted to this taxon (Harcourt 1992) . For example, coalitions or alliances have been documented in hyenas (Crocuta crocuta; Zabel et al. 1992) , wolves (Canis lupus; Fentress et al. 1986) , lions (Panthera leo; Packer & Pusey 1982) , cheetahs (Acinonyx jubatus; Caro 1994), coatis (Nasura narica; Russell 1983) and dolphins (Tursiops trucatus; Conner 1992; Connor et al. 1992) . In most instances, such polyadic aggressive interactions involve an animal intervening in a dyadic interaction between other group members (Harcourt & de Waal 1992) . The intervening animal is often dominant in rank to others involved in the interaction, but this need not be the case (see Silk (1992) for a review of rank and intervention). In addition, in primates, interventions most often take the form of the intervener coming to the aid of one of the two other individuals involved in the interaction (Harcourt & de Waal 1992) . In principle, however, intervening animals may simply break up an interaction between two others, without siding with either putative combatant. This type of intervention has been found in various primate species (Harcourt & de Waal 1992) , and in Melanochromatis auratus, a cichlid ¢sh (Nelissen 1985) .
Various functions have been proposed for intervention behaviour: e.g. supporting kin, reducing`social disruption', formation of alliances, promotion of group cohesion and tension reduction' (see Ehardt & Bernstein (1992) for a review). However, to date it appears that no theoretical work (i.e. mathematical models) has examined the evolution of intervention behaviour. Here, I develop a simple model for the evolution of interventions that serve only to break up ¢ghts (the intervener does not side with either party). I hypothesize that intervention is favoured in systems in which winner e¡ects, rather than loser e¡ects, predominate. In addition, I hypothesize that within systems wherein winner e¡ects are important, individuals further up in a hierarchy should be more likely to be involved in breaking up ¢ghts between other group members.
THE MODEL
For analytical tractability, I will consider the simplest possible group structure that allows for intervention behaviour: a group of three individuals. Model I will examine winner e¡ects alone, model II will look at loser e¡ects alone, and model III will examine intervention when winner and loser e¡ects operate simultaneously.
I will make the following four simplifying assumptions: (i) dyadic interactions are formed at random within groups; (ii) interventions take place after an initial round of ¢ghts that determine the rank of the three group members; (iii) interventions are always successful in the sense that they stop others from undertaking aggressive interaction; and (iv) winner and loser e¡ects have a memory window of one move. For example, a victory during aggressive encounter T would make winning more likely in the next encounter a player had (encounterT + 1), but not in encountersT + 2, etc.
The following variables are de¢ned: p ij is the probability that i defeats j, given that no winner or loser e¡ects are in operation, where i and j can assume any of the three possible positions in a hierarchy: a, b or g. B i are the bene¢ts accrued to individual i for its position in the hierarchy (see Pusey & Packer (1995) for a review of such bene¢ts). C i are the costs accrued to individual i for intervening in a ¢ght between others. These costs might include risk of injury, energy expenditure, etc. (Silk 1992) . W is the`winner e¡ect'. This measures an individual's increased probability of victory at time T + 1, given prior victory at time T. For analytical reasons, W is represented as the reduced probability of defeating an individual with prior winning experience. 04W 41. L is the`loser e¡ect'. This measures an individual's increased probability of losing at time T + 1, given prior defeats at time T. For analytical reasons, L is represented as the increased probability of defeating an individual with prior losing experience. 04L4(17p ij )/p ij . This upper boundary assures that the greatest chance of defeating an opponent with prior defeats is 1. Should an a individual opt to intervene in a ¢ght between b and g, its incremental change in ¢tness after such an act would be:
where the ¢rst term is the probability of a defeating b, multiplied by the pay-o¡ for such a victory, weighted by the probability of such an interaction. The second term is the probability of a defeating g, multiplied by the pay-o¡ for such a victory, weighted by the probability of such an interaction, and the last term is the cost of intervening. Notice that when intervention occurs there are no winner e¡ects in expression (1), as intervention by a does not allow either b or g to emerge as a victor in their dyadic interaction. Expression (1) can be rewritten as:
The ¢tness of a, should it not intervene, can be de¢ned as follows:
The term in the ¢rst set of squared brackets represents a's interactions with b. The right-hand term in the numerator is the probability of defeating b, weighted by the appropriate pay-o¡, given that a did not intervene in a ¢ght between b and g, and g went on to win such a ¢ght. The left-hand side of the numerator is the same case, given that b went on to win such a ¢ght (i.e. the ¢ght that a did not break up). The term in the second set of squared brackets represents a's interactions with g and should be interpreted in a manner similar to that just described.
Rearranging and simplifying, expression (3) can be rewritten as:
a individuals should then intervene whenever expression (2) 4 expression (4). This occurs when:
Inequality (5) demonstrates that increasing winner e¡ects or the strength of a 's position in the hierarchy (re£ected by p ab and p ag ) makes intervention by a more likely, whereas increasing the costs of intervention does the opposite.
(ii) Case II: when should b individuals intervene?
Using the same procedure as in expressions (1)^(4), it can be shown that b should intervene whenever the ¢tness increment accrued for intervention,
outweighs the ¢tness increment accrued for not intervening,
Hence, b should intervene in ¢ghts whenever
As was the case for a, equation (8) shows that increasing winner e¡ects or the strength of b 's position in the hierarchy (re£ected by p ba and p bg ) makes intervention by b more likely, whereas increasing the costs of intervention has the converse e¡ect. Moreover, one can assess the relative likelihood of b 's intervention compared with a's (i.e. is b more or less likely to intervene in ¢ghts than a?). A comparison of the right-hand terms in inequalities (5) and (8) show that the denominator of (8) is less than the denominator of (5), thus demonstrating that a is more likely to intervene in ¢ghts than b, as the B/C ratio for intervention is lower for a individuals.
(iii) Case III: when should g individuals intervene?
g's ¢tness increment for intervening is equal to
g's ¢tness increment for not intervening can be written as:
g should then intervene when expression (9) is greater than expression (10), which is equivalent to
As was the case for a and b, increasing winner e¡ects or the strength of g 's position in the hierarchy (re£ected by p ga and p gb ) makes intervention by g more likely, whereas increasing the costs of intervention has the converse e¡ect. A comparison of the right-hand terms in inequalities (8) and (11) shows that the denominator of inequality (11) is less than the denominator of (8), thus demonstrating that b is more likely to intervene in ¢ghts than is g. 
If a intervenes, its ¢tness increment is the same as in expression (2). If a does not intervene, then its ¢tness increment equals
The term in the ¢rst set of squared brackets represents a's interactions with b. The right-hand term in the numerator is the probability of defeating b, weighted by the appropriate pay-o¡, given that a did not intervene in a ¢ght between b and g, and b went on to lose such a ¢ght. The left-hand side of the numerator is the same case, given that b went on to win such a ¢ght (i.e. the ¢ght that a did not break up). The term in the second set of squared brackets represents a's interactions with g and should be interpreted in a similar manner to that just described. Expression (12) can be rewritten as
It can be shown that expression (2) is greater than expression (13) when
Because the right-hand side of inequality (14) is always negative, while the left is always positive, a individuals should not intervene when loser e¡ects alone are at play in a system.
(ii) Case II: when should b individuals intervene? b's ¢tness increment for intervening is de¢ned by expression (6). Its ¢tness for not intervening is equal to
Expression (6) is greater than expression (15) when
As in inequality (14), the left-hand part of this inequality is always positive and the right-hand side is always negative. b individuals then should not intervene when loser e¡ects alone operate.
g individuals should intervene when the following condition is met
which is equivalent to the case where
As was the case for a and b, g individuals then should not intervene when loser e¡ects alone operate. Again, a's ¢tness increment, should it intervene, is de¢ned by expression (2). When a does not intervene, its ¢tness increment when both winner and loser e¡ects are in play is
which can be rearranged to
Then, a should intervene when expression (2) is greater than expression (20), which is true when
b's ¢tness increment, should it intervene, is still de¢ned by equation (6). If b does not intervene, its ¢tness increment is then
Expression (22) can be rearranged to
Then, b should intervene when expression (6) is greater than expression (23), which is true when
Using the same procedure as in expressions (19)^ (24), it can be shown that g should intervene when
Equations (21), (24) and (25) demonstrate that when winner and loser e¡ects both exist in a system, then it is these values (i.e. W and L) relative to one another that determine whether intervention is favoured. The greater the value of W when compared with L, the greater the probability that intervention will be favoured. As for the case of winner e¡ects alone, absolute intervention probabilities can be ranked as a 4 b 4 g.
DISCUSSION
A simple model for the evolution of intervention behaviour as a function of winner and loser e¡ects shows the following three general results:
1. When winner e¡ects alone exist, intervention is favoured by increasing such winner e¡ects, as well as increasing an individual's standing in a hierarchy and/ or the bene¢ts of intervention. Naturally, increasing the costs of intervention makes such behaviour less likely. The probability of intervention based on rank is shown to be a 4 b 4 g (i.e. top-ranked individual 4 middleranked individual 4 lowest-ranked individual). 2. When loser e¡ects alone are at play in a system, intervention is never favoured, regardless of rank. 3. If both winner and loser e¡ects are operating simultaneously, then the likelihood of intervention behaviour evolving is a function of the relative strength of these two e¡ects. The greater the winner e¡ect relative to the loser e¡ect, the more likely intervention behaviour is to evolve.
When winner e¡ects alone operate, intervention is likely to be favoured because it inhibits others in a group from getting on a roll'. That is, intervention by individual i ends encounters that might allow others in the group to emerge victorious during an aggressive interaction, and in the long run to be more of a threat to individual i as a result. Conversely, when loser e¡ects are in play, interventions would break up interactions that could decrease another group member's long-term chances of defeating any other group member and are therefore selected against. It is worth noting that behavioural endocrinology work has shown that`aggressive' and`submissive' behaviours are often controlled by di¡erent hormones (Nelson 1995) , and thus it is not unreasonable to model winner e¡ects in the absence of loser e¡ects and vice versa. Even if both operate in a given system, however, model III shows clearly that intervention can evolve in such systems, given that the winner e¡ect is relatively potent.
Only recently have behavioural ecologists studied intervention behaviour in animals, and the vast majority of this work has been undertaken in primates (Harcourt & de Waal 1992) . By contrast, much of the work on winner and loser e¡ects has not been in primates, but rather, early on in rodents (Ginsburg & Allee 1942; Seward 1946) , and more recently in ¢sh (see Chase et al. (1994) for a review). Hopefully, the model presented here, which demonstrates how winner and loser e¡ects can drive the evolution of intervention behaviour, will spur future work looking at all these factors simultaneously in primates, ¢sh and many other taxa.Tests of the models presented here could include examining whether populations with pronounced winner versus loser e¡ects contain individuals that intervene in ¢ghts more often. One could also work in the opposite direction and study populations that are known to have individuals that intervene and test whether winner e¡ects are stronger than loser e¡ects in such populations.
